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Scott Gehlbach: Representation through 
Taxation. Revenue, Politics and 
Development in Postcommunist States 
Cambridge 2008: Cambridge University 
Press, 208 pp.
Scott Gehlbach’s new book adds an impor-
tant argument to the literature on the polit-
ical economy of taxation. Focusing on the 
tax systems in post-communist countries in 
Central Eastern Europe and the former So-
viet Union in the 1990s, Gehlbach argues 
that a state’s economic policy may promote 
those branches of the economy which can 
be most easily taxed. ‘The postcommunist 
experience […] suggests that governments 
may structure their tax bases to maximize 
revenue in the least costly way, promoting 
through various means those sectors that 
are relatively tax compliant at the expense 
of those that are not.’ (p.6) This means that 
if a government wants to maximise reve-
nue but is not capable of organising a com-
plex tax administration, the easy way out is 
to rely on the economic branches that ﬁ nd 
it hardest to evade taxes. These industries 
tend to be highly concentrated, enabling 
the government to direct its taxation efforts 
at just a few companies, or else rely on vis-
ible, for instance, state-controlled, distribu-
tion channels, like state-run oil pipelines.
This argument has a number of impor-
tant implications for the analysis not only 
of tax systems but also of economic policy 
and of interest groups in general. First, the 
state may not necessarily support the 
branches of the economy with the biggest 
political inﬂ uence in terms of Olson’s logic 
of collective action (or those that foster the 
socio-economic development of society), 
but might simply favour the sectors that 
are easiest to tax. Second, the dependence 
of the state budget on tax revenue from a 
few key sectors may then steer economic 
policy into a ‘revenue trap’, as Gehlbach 
calls it. Given that big (often monopolistic) 
and highly taxed industries, which the 
state supports in such a scenario, are un-
likely to drive economic innovation, eco-
nomic policy increasingly ends up promot-
ing structural inefﬁ ciencies. In this case, 
the author asserts that ‘small businesses 
[…] had two strikes against them in the 
competition for resources. Not only did 
they ﬁ nd it difﬁ cult to organize in defense 
of their interests, but the relative ease with 
which they hid revenues from the state 
gave politicians little other reason to pro-
mote their development’. (p.14) With that, 
Gehlbach’s focus is on policy implementa-
tion, while Olson’s focus is more on bar-
gaining over policy-related legislation.
The focus of economic policy on a few 
taxpayers (i.e. on large monopolistic ﬁ rms 
in certain industries) thus hampers eco-
nomic innovation and development, as 
these enterprises not only face the minor 
(according to Gehlbach) disadvantage of a 
higher tax burden but also enjoy the great-
er advantage of broad state support. On 
the other hand, new, private, small and of-
ten innovative companies can evade taxes 
but suffer from red tape. ‘Whether for rev-
enue reasons or because of the organiza-
tion of interests, politicians seem unlikely 
to shift support to the entrepreneurial econ-
omy, given the current allocation of labour 
and capital. Hope for change therefore 
seems to rest on the ability of entrepre-
neurs to ﬁ nd private substitutes for public 
goods and so circumvent a political econo-
my biased against them.’ (p. 147)
Contrasting Central Eastern Europe 
(the ten post-communist countries that are 
now in the EU plus Albania, Croatia, and 
Macedonia) with the CIS (the twelve states 
on the territory of the former Soviet Union 
minus the Baltic states), Gehlbach demon-
strates that after the end of communism 
the Central Eastern European states shifted 
to a ‘Western’ tax system with a broad tax 
base and assigned a prominent role to tax-
es on personal income, while the CIS states 
focused taxation on a few big, often mo-
nopolistic industrial enterprises and with 
that on corporate taxes and taxes on goods 
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and services. The CIS thus constitutes 
Gehlbach’s empirical case for the revenue 
trap, while Central Eastern Europe serves 
as a contrasting case. Gehlbach summaris-
es his line of argumentation as follows: 
Variation in initial conditions leads to vari-
ation in postcommunist tax systems, such 
that tax systems in the former Soviet Union 
are generally structured more around ‘old’ 
revenue sources, whereas those in [Central] 
Eastern Europe draw more on ‘new’ sourc-
es. These tax systems, in turn, determine 
the division of gains between politicians 
and ﬁ rms from collective-good provision 
and so structure the incentives to provide 
those goods. Politicians in the former Sovi-
et Union respond to these incentives by 
promoting economic activity that they 
know how to tax, whereas their counter-
parts in [Central] Eastern Europe exhibit 
little bias of this sort. These initial outcomes 
then interact with factor mobility to deter-
mine long-run trajectories of economic de-
velopment, with labour and capital re-
sponding to collective-goods provision and 
vice versa, until eventually politicians and 
factory owners settle into a relationship of 
mutual dependence. (p. 17)
Gehlbach uses econometric analyses 
to determine the explanatory factors for 
the variation in tax systems among the two 
aforementioned regions to identify which 
branches of the economy were favoured 
by the different states and why and to de-
termine the resulting consequences for 
 economic development. He uses tax data 
and economic data for the 1990s from the 
World Bank, secondary sources, and inter-
view results from the 1999 round of the 
World Bank’s and EBRD’s Business Envi-
ronment and Enterprise Performance Sur-
vey (BEEPS), which included about 4000 en-
terprises in 25 post-communist countries. 
Gehlbach then goes on to build a formal 
model of the revenue trap and of represen-
tation through taxation, that is, of political 
decision-making when policy-makers take 
into account not only the promises of the 
collective actors (lobbies) but also the un-
coordinated activities (like tax payments) 
of members of both organised and unor-
ganised groups. The author presents and 
tests his hypotheses in a very concise and 
stringent way. He thoroughly discusses da-
ta quality, which he admits is not too good 
in parts, but is nonetheless sound enough 
to support his overall argument.
Concerning his conclusions on causal 
relations, however, there is one unexplained 
shift of focus. In the chapter dealing with 
the explanatory factors for the variation in 
tax systems he stresses the importance of 
initial conditions: ‘I demonstrate in partic-
ular that much of the variation in postcom-
munist tax structure can be traced to three 
initial conditions that varied across coun-
tries in Eastern Europe and the former So-
viet Union: the industrial structure inherit-
ed from communism, proximity to the 
West, and the level of economic develop-
ment at the start of transition.’ (p. 28) How-
ever, in the sections of the book summaris-
ing his results, the focus is on policy choic-
es: ‘The lesser taxability of new private 
economic activity in the former Soviet Un-
ion – the result of decisions made in the 
early and mid-1990s about what revenue 
sources to tap […].’ (p. 146). Here a more 
systematic debate would be of vital impor-
tance for the argument, as it would either 
attribute the revenue trap to political in-
competence or to path dependencies. 
More broadly speaking, a student of 
political economy will miss a systematic 
elaboration of the conditions causing (or 
promoting) the revenue trap. Many of them 
are mentioned in passing. They include 
1) a deep structural crisis in the economy, 
which offers the state the chance to inﬂ u-
ence the economic structure in the short 
term; 2) an industrial structure dominat-
ed by big (often monopolistic) enterprises, 
which are easy to tax; 3) the absence of ori-
entation towards EU membership, which 
would demand a Western-style tax reform; 
4) a low level of economic development, 
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implying an inefﬁ cient (i.e. incompetent, 
under-ﬁ nanced, or corrupt) state bureauc-
racy and tax administration; 5) few restric-
tions on formal economic policy-making, 
such that the dominant state actor can push 
related tax regulation through the legisla-
tive process without relevant opposition 
from other political forces or business in-
terests; and ﬁ nally 6) policy choices based 
on tax revenue as a ﬁ rst-order political con-
cern and favouring easy revenues from en-
terprises with high taxability. However, 
this convincing set of explanatory factors 
found throughout the book is then dropped 
by Gehlbach in favour of the policy choice 
argument. Though this shortcoming does 
not limit the validity of his argument about 
the nature and consequences of the revenue 
trap, an elaboration of the causes would of-
fer criteria for a generalisation beyond the 
speciﬁ c case (i.e. the former Soviet Union 
of the 1990s).
For an area studies specialist with a fo-
cus on the CIS (and especially on its major 
economies, i.e. Russia, Ukraine, and Kaza-
khstan), Gehlbach’s study offers a compel-
ling argument for explaining not only tax 
policy but also a state’s general attitude to-
wards different branches of the economy. It 
thus provides important insights into the 
political role of oligarchs, who own some of 
the most taxable enterprises, and expands 
the debate about the resource curse, that is, 
the dependence of national economies on 
natural resource production. In addition, 
the study also adds to the recent discussion 
about the nature and policy aims of Rus-
sia’s re-nationalisation drive. The revenue 
trap thesis thus makes an important contri-
bution to the analysis of economic policy 
and economic development in the region. 
However, area studies specialists will 
miss a detailed case study of the causal 
mechanisms of the revenue trap as well as 
a discussion of the political and public de-
bates about it. Because Gehlbach treats 
countries as mere data sets (focusing on a 
few key indicators) and does not cover 
state actors, he is not able to identify the 
main actors in the policy-making process 
leading to the revenue trap. Therefore, he 
cannot examine the interaction between 
big ‘taxable’ enterprises and relevant state 
actors, which is an important part of the 
revenue trap story, because it determines 
the relative success of a state’s strategy. For 
example, there is no mention of why Rus-
sia’s Gazprom, a partly state-owned gas 
monopoly and thus one of the country’s 
most taxable enterprises, was overdue in 
more than 40% of its tax payments at the 
end of the 1990s. Gehlbach is also not able 
to explain why taxation differs between big 
enterprises within the same sector, the way 
it did between Russia’s major oil companies 
in the 1990s. Although these points do not 
weaken Gehlbach’s overall thesis, which 
seems to be the best explanation of Russia’s 
tax policy available so far, they nevertheless 
demand a more detailed study. A closer 
look at CIS countries like Belarus, Turkmen-
istan, or Uzbekistan, however, might reveal 
that their tax policy is closer to the commu-
nist planned economy, where ‘taxation was 
largely an accounting matter’ (p. 5), than to 
the post-communist revenue trap, where 
state actors struggle to regain taxation 
power over parts of the economy.
In sum, Gehlbach’s book makes an im-
portant contribution to collective action 
theory, to the political economy of taxation, 
and to theories of economic development. 
Its contribution to area studies, however, is 
less marked. As the book has just some 
130 pages of text (the remaining pages are 
ﬁ lled with tables and graphs) it cannot be 
the source of all kinds of analyses for all 
kinds of readers. Instead Gehlbach presents 
a concise, well-argued, innovative and em-
pirically based treaty on the political econ-
omy of taxation in the case of states with 
weak administrative capacities.
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